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Introduction
An important area in the study of public policy has been research dir ecte d
at assessing the consequences of polic y action. Generally conducted under th e
heading of program evaluation , the researc h attention has centered both on
th e development of appropriate methodologies for evaluation analysis as well
as th e measur eme nt of the results of substantive policy actions. Relatively
little attention, however , has be en directed at th e various assumptions which
underlie much of the research in th e area of program evaluation. In this paper
we will address several of the major assumptions and discuss their relev ance to
the conduct of an evaluation analysis. In particular, we will discuss the
potential impact of these assumptions on issues such as the scope of the
evaluation, the choice of evaluative criteria, and the type of research design
emp loyed. While we do not assume that the list of assumptions discussed is
exhaustive, we do intend that it be provocative and, we hop e, representative
of the assumptions underlying program evaluation in various substantive
contexts.
Terminolo gy
In general terms , program evaluation may be conceptualized as the research enterprise concerned with analyzing the relationship between program intentions and program performance. More specifically, it measur es th e
extent to which a program action was successful in achieving its intended goals
or objectives. 1 In principle the output from a program evaluation serves as
input (i.e. , feedback on program results ) for decision-making about future
resource allocations (e.g ., to continue, modify , or discontinue a program ).
One can easily find numerous candidates for a program evaluation. Will a
Volunteer-in-Probation program significant ly decrease the probability of recidivism among adult misdemeanants? Will a high-intensity street lighting
program significantly decrease the incidence of on-street assaults in a given
'Thomas J. Cook and Frank P. Scioli, Jr ., "A Resea rch Strategy for Analyzing the Impacts of
Public Policy .·· Administrative Science Quarterly 17 (September , 1972), 328-339 ; and Thom as J.
Coo k and Frank P. Scioli, Jr ., "Impact Analysis in Political Science Resea rch " in K. Dolb eare
(ed. ), Policy Evaluation (Beve rly Hills. Ca. : Sage Publi shin g Co., 1975).
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area? Will an income maint enance program be an incentive for finding
e mployment? Will an "operation identification " progr am significantly increase the recovery of stolen property by those victimized? These are all
potential targets for a program evaluation. Although the programs differ , the
general research problem is the same: determining the specific effects which
may reasonably be attributed to a given program activity.
Important to an appreciation of this type of research is an understanding of
the assumptive behavior which guides much of the evaluative research. By
assumptions, we mean those aspects of evaluation research which are "ta ken
for granted," or at least not tested directly , and yet may have important
consequences for either the social utility of the program or the validity of th e
eva luation conclusions. For example, one might adopt a narrow view of
program impact , and , consequently, conduct observations on a limited set of
impact indicators. This narrow view may reflect the assumption that only
positive or beneficial, consequences will result from a particular activity.
Much of the Volunteers-in-Probation
movement is characterized by this
viewpoint, that is, if a person volunteers his time , he or she must be doing
some good. In many cases, there is a reluctanc e to admit the possibility of
negative effects resulting from volunteer-probationer interaction , such as in
one-to-one counseling. Thus, the assumption of "only positive results " may
limit the types of indicators selected for measuring program impact and set
boundaries on the scope of program consequences which cou ld be measur ed .
In this paper we will focus on various assumptions dealing with the values , or
subjective preferenc es, which may influence the conduct of a program evaluation .
Value assumptions got to the very heart of the evaluation enterprise and
pertain to the basic premises upon which the research is conducted. They
raise issues about the principles which should guide evaluation research such
as the "legitimate" purposes of evaluation research and the "proper role" of
the program evaluator. In other words, what questions ought to be asked and
how should they be investigated? Value assumptions are important, as they
often estab lish the boundaries for the evaluative effort in that they set limits as
to the scope and nature of the questions asked vis-a-vis the determination of
program "success." In most cases they are implicit, rather than explicit, and
the prescriptive guidelines suggested by the assumptions are followed in the
absence of any justifying evidence, empirical or otherwise. As the discussion
below will point out, there is also somewhat less than a perfect consensus on
the "best " set of prescriptive gujdelines to be followed in a program evaluation.
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Value Assumptions
The first assumption deals with program evaluation as a competitor for
resources in the over-all budgetary allocation of a program . The proevaluation assumption is that every program can, and should, be evaluated.
Moreover , it is assumed that a program , even before it is funded , should have
built into it the mechanism for determining whether or not the program was a
success. An example of this is the provision in Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) funding which requires that funded programs must
have an evaluation component. Th e trade-off here is that money spent for
evaluation is not available for providing program service, or treatment. Thus ,
the opportunity-cost of deni ed treatment is balanced against the desire for
information about the extent to which a program is achieving its objectives. It
is assumed in this type of budgetary situation that the value of the program
evaluation (expressed in terms of providing more efficient and effective service in the future ) outweighs the short-run deprivation of individuals who
would otherwise receive the service contained within the program.
A corollary point of a methodological nature deals with the use of control
groups in program evaluation. The argument here is that a more valid evaluation can only be obtained when a treatment group is compared against a group
which did not receive a particular treatment , in order to have a comparative
baseline from which to as ess the impact of a particular program. We label this
the "co ntrol group dilemma " in that a control group is denied a service that
"may" be of great benefit in order that the researchers maximize the value of
obtaining a "va lid" evaluation.
The counter argument contends that it is wrong to deny a potentially
beneficial service to a group of people merely to achieve a desired level of
methodological sophistication. One often hears this argument from personnel
responsible for administering a program. Their contention is that "we're too
busy helping th e people in the program to take time out for evaluation, and
besides it's wrong to deny people a service they really need. " The rebuttal, of
course, is "how do you know the program is effective, and meets the needs of
the people, unless you've systematically evaluated it? " Thus, we have a
conflict in values - allocation of resources to provide service vs. the allocation
of resources to determine service effectiveness.
A related dispute is relevant to the contention that every program can, and
should, be evaluated. One position is that some evaluation is better than none
at all, regardless of the data limitations present in the evaluation setting. The
converse position is that of foregoing an evaluation of a program where the
design of the evaluation is severely constrained by the available data and there
is high probability of inconclusive , or misleading, results. The debate of
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Campbell and Erl ebac her vs. th e Westinghouse Group is illustrativ e of this
point. 2 Campbell and Erlebacher contend that the Head Start evaluations had
such severe methodological problems , especially with regard to the regression artifact threat , that the evaluations should not hav e been undertaken
since the conclusions were of such dubious validity and, henc e, potentially
misleading. The rejoinder to this argument was that while th e regression
artifact problem was present in the data , the program was of such importance
that an evaluation of it, even if only partially valid, was required for future
policy decisions . The conflict here is b e tween the preference for only highly
valid program evaluations vs. the acceptability of "satisficing " evaluations
under conditions of limited control over the research setting. The former
position argues that a " bad " (i.e., methodologically suspect) eva luation is
worse than no evaluation at all, whereas the latter position contends that the
validity of an evaluation is a matter of degree and that some information about
program success is better than no information at all.
A third major area of value conflict lies in the emphasis upon the "Sc ien tific
Method " as the correct model for program evaluation. The dispute often
centers upon th e quantification of program objectives and measur es of program success. The conflict becomes readily apparent when one contrasts the
views of the program personnel with those of the academic researc her. An
example of this can be found in the area of volunteer programs in courts and
corrections. The academic researcher will call for objective meas ures , such as
the probability of recidivism , whereas the volunteer will stress more subjective impressions like "the person feels better about himself and is much more
able to relate to others." In our research in this area, we have run across
statements such as "It's impossible to quantify the effectiveness of one-to-one
counseling because it is such a personal matter. " A further contention is that
quantification tends to force concepts, such as program objectives and effectiveness criteria into unrealistic and impractical categories which lose much of
the "esse nce" of the program as it operates and affects people 's lives. The
converse position is that these types of qualitative impressions are not objective indicators and are totally limited to personal perceptions and subjective
interpretations, hence , they do not provide unambiguous measures of program goals or the extent to which these goals have been achieved.
2 See the following: Donald T. Campbell and Albert Erlebacher, " How Regression Artifacts
in Quasi-Experimental Evaluations Can Mistakenl y Make Compensatory Education Look Hannful, · in J. H ellmuth (ed. ), Compensatory Education: A ational Debate, Vol. 3, Disadvantaged
Child (N. Y.: Brunn er/ Hazel, 1970), 185-210; Victor G. Cicirelli , "The Relevance of the Regression Artifact Problem to th e Westinghouse Ohfo Evaluation of Head-Start: A Reply to Cam.J?bell
and Erlebacher," in J . Hellmuth , op. cit., 211-215; John W. Evans and Jeffry Schiller , · How
Preoccupation with Possible Regression Artifacts Can Lead to a Faulty Strategy for the Evaluation
of Social Action Program s: A Reply to Campb II and Erlebacher, " in J. Hellmuth , op. cit.,
216-220.
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The conflict seems to center on the preference for "analytical objectivity "
vs. the preference for a more personalized approach which evaluates a program in terms of the qualitative differences resulting from program participation .
A variant of this conflict is very pronounced in the area of "human experimentation. "3 One argument is that you can't experiment with people's
emotions, feelings, beliefs , etc., but rather these must be approached within a
mor e subjective inter-personal mode of analysis. The converse position is that
experimentation is the most valid means for testing hypothesized causal
relationships between program activities and measurable changes in
program-relevant behavior. One might contend this conflict goes even deeper
and relates to the point made above concerning the "control group dilemma"
whereby services are withheld from a group in order to provide a baseline
from which to measure program effect. The anti-experimentalist would argue
that it is wrong to withhold a needed service to satisfy a methodological
requirement , such as random assignment to treatment and control groups.
Besides , the impersonal nature of the random assignment procedure negates
the essential "humanity " of the program. The pro-experimentation person
would counter that , in the more realistic situation of scarce resources and
competing claims for resources , the random assignment procedure is actually
the "fairest" means of allocating the available resources since everyone has an
equal chance of being selected to receive the program service.
A fourth area of value conflict concerns the "proper " role of the program
evaluator. This assumption posits that the primary job of the program
evaluator is to measure the extent to which a program achieves its objectives,
and not to question either the social utility of the objectives, or the values
upon which they are based. This view conceives of the program evaluator as a
"neutral " analyst whose job is to evaluate program success in terms of the
objectives as stated by the responsible program agency. The question here is
not only can the evaluator be a completely neutral observer but also should he
be a neutral observer? An example might point up the potential dilemma
here. It could be argued that the most efficient way to reduce the probability
of a person convicted of murder being a repeater of that crime is to implement
a program of capital punishment. Likewise , one might argue that an effective
way of dealing with convicted rapists would be to castrate them, la the Billy
Graham suggestion of a few years ago. Is the proper role of the program
evaluator merely to assess the extent to which these types of programs achieve
their objectives or does he have a responsibility to question the values which

a

3 See for examp le, Frank P. Scioli, Jr. and Thomas J. Cook, "Ex perim ental Design in Policy
Impact Analysis." Social Science Quarterly 54 (Sept embe r, 1973) 271-280.
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und erlie th e pro gram s? Th at is, should he choose be twee n th e value of a
short-run redu ction in crimin al activity vs. th e valu e of pr ese rving hu man life
and re lated capacities in th e hopes of futur e rehabilit ation ?
To conside r an oth er exampl e: Suppo se a resea rche r has bee n commi ssioned to evalu ate a pr ogram which has th e prim ary obj ec tive of increasing the
absolute reading level of black childr en loca ted in severa l ghetto kind e rgarten
classes. Suppo se, how eve r , th at his own pr efe rence is for a pr ogra m d es igned
to reduce th e gap betwee n th e readin g leve l for black childr en and th at of
middl e-class, whit e childr en located in se lec ted suburb an scho ols. In th e
latte r in stance, th e pe rform ance leve ls of th e whit e childr en would constitut e
th e stand ard by whi ch th e pro gram is eva luated rath e r th an th e pr e-p rogra m
leve ls of th e black childr e n . Th e situ ation confrontin g th e eva luator is fairly
clea r. Do es th e e valuator acce pt th e objecti ve as se t forth in th e official
pro gram state ment and use thi s as th e stand ard for eva luatin g th e pro gram , or
does he exe rci se an ind epend ent jud gm e nt in challen gin g th e ultim ate social
value of th e obj ec tive and becom e an advo cate for a diffe rent se t· of pro gram
obj ectiv es and , con sequ entl y, a diffe rent se t of evaJuativ e crit e ria? Moreo ve r,
should th e evalu ator e mplo y hi s pr efe rr ed se t of evaluative crit e ria eve n if it
may redu ce th e acce ptabilit y of his recomm end ation s by th e spon sorin g
age ncy and hind e r th eir chan ces for futur e p olicy impl e me ntation ? As can be
see n, th e choi ces mad e by th e evalu ator in th ese typ es of situ ation s may have
profound con sequ ences for th e condu ct of th e evaluation , th e kind of inform ation it produ ces and th e po ssibilit y of affectin g futur e policy .
A coroll ary point can be mad e rega rdin g th e pe rspec tive from whi ch th e
pro gram is evaluated. In e mpl oyin g th e age ncy's pro gram obj ectives as th e
pe rform ance stand ard , th e resea rche r is assumin g th at th e se obj ecti ves are
consistent with th e nee ds of th e clie nt e le suppo sedl y se rved by th e pro gram .
Th e extent of con sistency, or incon sistency, be twee n official pro gram objectiv es and clie nt nee d s is, of cour se, very import ant if on e evalu ates th e
pro gram from th e p ersp ec tive of th e client. Should th e pro gram evaluator
me re ly assum e that a hi gh deg ree of con siste ncy exists, or should he see k
evidence conc ernin g thi s relationship ? If he finds a high deg ree of incon siste ncy , what is hi s prop e r cour se of action regardin g th e condu ct of th e
ev aluation ? In oth e r word s, does he becom e a spok es man for th e client s of th e
pro gram in deve lopin g effective ness crit e ria whi ch reflec t th e ir exte nt of nee d
satisfaction , or does he becom e an age ncy spok es man by e valu atin g th e
pro gram in te rm s of th e obj ectiv es th at th e age ncy h as id entifi ed and upon
which th e age ncy wishes th e pro gram to be evaluat ed ?
Th e point on th e prop e r rol e of th e evaluator introdu ces anoth er area of
di sagree ment whi ch ha s received consid e rabl e att enti on in th e lite ratur e.
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This involves th e issue of whether or not th e programs should be evaluated by
people inside or outside of th e agency administering the program .4 One
po sition argues that the pro gram should be evaluated by people who are
intim ate ly involved in th e administration and impl ementation of the program
because they have the grea test amount of familiarity with the program ,
und erstand the idiosyncratic features of program implem e ntation , and, consequ ently , are in a better position to evaluate th e success of the program. The
converse position is that people involved in administering the program may
have a vested int eres t in producing evaluations which show that the program
is a success. Thu s, their involvem ent in , and commitment to, the program
may bias their judgment and pr eclud e th eir being able to render an "objective" eva luation of program achievement. This position argu es that the evaluation should be performed by a person from outside the administe1;ng agency
who ha s th e necessary "independence " to conduct an impartial evaluation.
Th e outside e valuator would , in effect, lend an aura of legitimacy to the
eva luation by his non-involvement (at leas t formally ) in the administration of
the program . Th ere is no easy solution to this dilemma and numerous people
fall on both sides of the question. The choice rests upon the assumptions made
concernin g the relativ e value of an "impartial" outside evaluation vs. an inside
eval uation by people actively involved in th e program who have a "fuller
understanding " of the program 's op era tion .
The final consideration involves an area which , perhaps in large part ,
affects all of the previously discussed issues. This entails the criteria for
selecting programs to be evaluated. 5 Since , obviously , not all social programs
have bee n, or will be , evaluated, choices are made to evaluate some programs
and let oth e r programs go unexamined. In the final analysis, these kinds of
choices most directly relate to determining the value of program evaluation as
a generator of decision-relevant information , since the general utility of
evaluation will be largely determined by the type of programs evaluated.
Several qu estions may be raised about what types of choices are made and the
values th ey reflect. Is a program selected for evaluation because it does not
involve a politically sensitive area and it would therefore be relatively easy to
obtain the necessary cooperation for the evaluation? Is a program evaluated
because it involves an area which has readily available data? Is a program
selected because the researcher is confident that his recommendations would
actually affect future policy? Is a program not evaluated because it has been in
4 For a discuss ion of th e pros and cons of each position see: Harry Hatry , et al., Practical
Program Evaluation for State and Local Governments (Washington, D . C .: Th e Urban Institut e,
1973).
5
Caro l H . Weiss, "Where Politi cs and Evaluation Resea rch Mee t," Evaluation l (Novemb e r,
1973), 37-45.
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existence for a long pe 1iod of tim e and ha s deve lop ed a powe rfu 1supp or tive
con stitu ency? Th ese , and oth e r exa mpl es whi ch could be menti oned , all
repr ese nt po ssibl e crit eria whi ch might go int o th e dec ision to se lec t a p rogram for eva luation . As such , th ey reflec t both th e pr efe rences of th e resea rche r and /or his pe rce ption s of th e realiti es e nd e mic to th e potenti al
evaluation se ttin g. In an y case , th e selec tion crit e ria n ot only serve to d ete rmin e whi ch pro gram s will be evaluated , but may provid e an indi cation of th e
futur e pro spec ts of a pro gram eve n before th e evalu ation res ult s are obt ain ed
in th at th ey may reflec t th e pr edomin ant valu es, or pr efe rences , at a give n
point in tim e .

Conclusion
In thi s pap e r we have had th e lu xur y of rai sing, and not be ing forced to
res olve, a numb e r of import ant issues involvin g confli ctin g value assumpti ons
re lative to evaluative resea rch . Pe rh ap s, as som e would argue, th ese issues
esc ape a final res olution , and are bes t left to th e philo soph e rs amon g us. W e
di sagree. We fee l th at th e y are a leg itimat e conc ern of th e poli cy analyst and
mu st be addr esse d both in term s of expli catin g th e assumption s und e rlyin g an
evalu ation and assess ing th e ir imp act up on policy recomm e nd ation s. We tru st
th at thi s pap e r repr ese nt s a positiv e step in th at dir ection .

